Program transcript:
Grant Reeher : Welcome to the Campbell Conversations, I'm Grant Reeher. In America, we seem to pay attention to only one international issue at a time, and lately, that's been the conflict with Iran. But the war in Ukraine carries on. And with me today to bring us up to date on that and also deepen our understanding of it, is Oxana Shevel. She's a professor of political science and director of the International Relations program at Tufts University. She's also the coauthor with Maria Popova of, "Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States". Professor Shevel, welcome to the program.
Oxana Shevel: Thank you for inviting me.
GR: We really appreciate you making the time. Let me just start with a basic question for you. What's the current situation in Ukraine? Where do things currently stand?
OS: The current situation is not that different from where it has been some months ago, and in some way even a year ago, when, of course, President Trump was thinking or saying that he could end this conflict very soon, like, you know, absolutely one day. But the conflict obviously still continues. And, in a way, Ukraine continues to resist Russian invasion, Russia continues to insist on maximalist aims. And this is why, I'm sure we'll get to the details, but this is ultimately why there is no settlement, because the demands and the interests of the two sides remain irreconcilable. And that has to do, again, with Russia wanting to subjugate Ukraine and Ukraine wanting to be a free state. And, you know, maybe the only sort of recent difference, and that's of course, was the war in the Middle East. The price of oil changing in a way that benefits Russia, so that's a concern. And at the same time, the weather improved in Ukraine and Russia has been freezing Ukrainian population with the strikes on the heating infrastructure through the coldest winter in recent history. So that's in a way, you know, a positive change in Ukraine that spring is here. But other than that, the conflict is pretty much where it has been for some months and years.
GR: And when you say, this is an obvious point but I want to make sure that our listeners are all on the same page with you, when you say that the war in Iran has helped Russia because of the oil, you mean because they are able to sell it for a better price and there's a higher demand for their oil, correct?
OS: Yes. There is high demand for the oil. Some sanctions have been eased. And again, you know, this war is very costly for Russia. They have been projecting an image of, you know, and I think in a way, some Western observers, including political leaders, are kind of buying this narrative that, you know, one way or the other, Russia has to win because it's bigger, stronger and so forth. But in a way, you know, Russian economy has been suffering with the sanctions and all of this. And the price of oil is very important for the war effort because, you know, certain prices projected as too they have to sell oil for at least that much. And now this price has been up a lot. So, in that sense, that's what that meant. Yes, that the increase in the price of oil helps Russia.
GR: And when you said that Russia is hanging on to its maximalist aims, just explain what maximalist means there in this context.
OS: Yeah. This is essentially what Popov’s and my book is about. That we have wrote this book, we were motivated to no small extent by trying to push back against the narrative that has been very prevalent in certain circles. This is sort of this realists take or perspective on the conflict that basically says that, well, you know, it’s bad that Russia invaded, but ultimately they invaded because they felt threatened by NATO expansion. And that's really what the conflict is about, that, you know, Ukraine had a change of government in 2014, it was going to enter NATO, it is threatening Russia and Russia invaded. And that's kind of what the root cause of the war is, right? But, you know, those who study Ukraine, who have studied Ukraine and Russian relations, who studied Ukrainian and Russian history as we have and many other experts in Ukraine have, do not buy this argument. And then again, the question becomes, what are the root causes of the war? And as we argue in the book, the root causes of the war is Russia's desire to not let Ukraine slip from its grasp. And we're not talking about just geopolitically, you know, of course, I mean, Ukrainian membership in NATO was never realistic and if it were ever was, Russia would look like it. But that's not really the main, neither necessary nor sufficient condition, we can say. And what it really goes down to is Russia not being able to accept Ukraine that is sovereign, that does its own thing in all sorts of policy areas, from historical memory politics to cultural development to economics. And again, we see this history of Russia becoming increasingly unwilling to accept this kind of Ukraine. And that's ultimately what this war is about. And so even if we look at specific, you know, disputes over, say, the territory in the Donbas, like I think some in America would say, and I think, again, that's part of the view in the current administration that there's some bunch of, you know, almost destroyed territory, what's the big deal? You know, just give it to Russia and then the war is over. But in Ukraine, nobody believes this because what ultimately it would mean that this is heavily fortified territory. If Russia were to take this territory, just opens the way for new aggression. And we've seen this since 2014, first Crimea, it's on the Crimea. Well, it wasn't on the Crimea because then there Donbas. And then sort of Donbas why it's not really because when they invaded in 2022, they go straight for Kiev. Why go straight for Kiev to decapitate the government if you are supposedly protecting Russian speakers in the east? Which, by the way, are the ones suffering the most from the bombing. So again, sort of in the same irreconcilable position, it ultimately goes down to Ukraine being determined, increasing this whole since ‘91 and especially since 2014, to have its own past, to be oriented to Europe, to be sovereign country, to not be under Russian dictate and Russia increasingly unable to accept that. And that's really why we have the clash of irreconcilable objectives, which have been there in ‘22, in 2014, and they’re here in 2026.
GR: So, I want to ask you a question about the United States for a moment, and then I want to come back and follow up on some of the things that you just said. Do you think that in the United States, the public attention on this war in Ukraine, despite the fact that it's the largest war in Europe since World War two, do you think that Americans are kind of suffering from an exhaustion of sorts with their waning attention or do you think it's the war with Iran has sort of pushed it out from people's attention span? What's your sense of that?
OS: Yeah, I would maybe mention two things here, because first of all, I think when we look at the opinion polls and, you know, if the American public believes that, you know, Ukraine should be supported and deserves U.S support, we still see substantial support. So this is, you know, this notion that, you know, Americans are tired. Actually in Ukraine there are memes about tired Westerners, like who should really be exhausted. It's not the westerners, but Ukrainians. But sort of that aside, first of all, there is still support, right, so even if, say, the administration is less skilled and less eager to support, I think the public understands, again, like this is, you know, very kind of the story that the smaller countries attacked by bigger country, by right and wrong. And this is really the conflict with right and wrong is very clear. There are many wars around the world, and when conflicts have lasted for generations where, you know, it's sort of confusing. Like who are the good guys? And I think here it really isn't confusing. But then again, you know, as you opened this program saying that the only one foreign policy issue seem to be kind of dominating the headlines. So, I think this is part of that, right? So again, we have a new conflict, obviously media attention has turned to that conflict. And then there is just less front page space, right? For everything else. And of course, you know, so I think in some sense it is understandable, but on the other sense, of course, it is also something to say, like, is this all media? Or to the working, you kind of latch onto whatever is in the news right now. So, I think both of these things are going on, as I said, the thing that is still substantial support and that's important to realize, but also the way the media prioritizes what to cover, something that is new and happening now and this sort of, you know, big and consequential in that way dominates the coverage.
GR: I'm Grant Reeher, you're listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media and my guest is Tufts University political science professor Oxana Shevel. And her recent book is titled, "Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States". So, let's talk a bit about this entangled history part of your argument and your book. How are the histories entangled and why is that so important?
OS: Yeah, I think this is very important. And this is why we chose the ‘entangled’ as opposed to ‘common’ or ‘joint’ or something like this. Because even to say that countries had like a common history implies that there is some sort of similar interpretation of what has happened. With the Russia and Ukrainian case, even though, of course, there has been a lot of developments that affected these territories together and separately, the way how this history is narrated is what really matters. And here we have a sense of, again, two narratives. So, the narrative that has been dominant since the imperial period in Russia and then in the Soviet period and remains in the post-Soviet Russia, maybe with some modification in the early 90s, but now it is back in full swing, uses this narrative that Ukraine and Russia belong together by right, that, you know, all the good Ukrainians, but all is for Russian or wanted to be with Russia and whoever was against it were somehow traitor. So, if you look at any figures in history, be it the early 18th century leader hetman Mazepa who betrayed the Russian Tsar by joining with the Swedes. He betrayed the Tsar, eight? Sure, but for what purpose? He betrayed the Tsar because he wanted Ukrainian territory and Ukrainian Cossacks to have great autonomy that Tsar's promised but then took away. So, what I'm saying here, and we also talk about it in the book, that the same history could be narrated very differently. It could be narrated from the standpoint that there was always a Ukrainian political idea. Yes, it was very different, its shape it took was very different in different historical periods. And these attempts have failed before in no small part because Russia would not allow it, right? But then again, that was oppression of these people and groups and interests who stood for greater separation. There was all sorts of crimes committed from the 1930s, you know, the famine and earlier in the previous centuries. But this history has been suppressed. It has been suppressed in the Soviet period, it has been suppressed in the Cyrus period. And Ukraine only begins to recover in the post-Soviet period. And this is why Russia would not tolerate it, because as far as they're concerned, and again, because it serves as the grand narrative, if you are trying to say, you know, Ukraine and Russia belong together and you have some historical justification for it, like, it makes it the stronger argument, right? But this historical narrative is like, well, here is another instance when there is contestation over the future of Ukraine, when there are people and groups in Ukraine who actually don't want to be under Russian rule, right? And now they are actually succeeding, right? This sort of, you know, the entangled history becomes narrated in a very, different ways. And this is actually has been one of the key issues in the post ‘91 period, because once Ukraine became independent state for the first time in, you know, in history that the state has been established and lasted more than just a few years, then, you know, there is actually this recovery of historical memory that is now talk about Soviet oppression, about Cyrus oppression, kind of rethinking of personalities such as Mazepa. Like, was he really a traitor, or was he in some way a positive character because he betrayed the Tsar for the reasons that actually were pro-Ukrainian, right? And if there is absolute rejection of this kind of, you know, historical developments in Ukraine because it goes to weaken this myth of eternal Russian-Ukrainian unity and everybody being on the same page and on the traitors wanting to, you know, break this unity. So, history in that sense is very important because again, we see Putin is completely wedded to this imperial reading of history. And he talks about, you know, he tried to convince (unintelligible) of all people, you know, going back to 11th century and concocting some arguments as if whatever happened there somehow explains and justifies what he does now. But that goes to the entangled problem, right? So, it is entangled in a way that developments in Ukraine and Ukrainian-Russian relations could be narrated different ways, and they have been narrated in a certain way by the powerful states, empire Soviet Union, Russia. And now Ukraine is doing it differently, and Russia just cannot tolerate that.
GR: When we come back after our break, I want to follow up with you and then ask the other piece of this, which is about how the how the governments go in different directions, post ’91. You're listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media. I'm Grant Reeher and I'm talking with Oxana Shevel, she's a political science professor at Tufts University and the coauthor of a recent book on Ukraine and the war with Russia, titled, "Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States". Well, as I said before the break, I want to sort of ask the other piece of this. You laid out how the histories are entangled, there's competing narratives here. But the governments, the states, how do they diverge after ‘91? They go in kind of different directions. Tell us about that.
OS: Yeah. This is also an important element in our book because in a way, our book is, you know, as I said already, in one way, it is pushing against this narrative that, you know, war is NATO's fault, but it is also not just a book about Russian imperialism. (unintelligible) The argument in the book is not that, you know, look, Russia was always imperialistic towards Ukraine and now that Ukraine, you know, it's trying to narrate its history and distinct identity, that's why Russia lashed out. That's a big part of it, but it really works in conjunction with divergence in political regimes in Russia and Ukraine. So, in other words, you know, the explanatory factors are, one, is this divergence in identity politics and Ukrainians increasingly committed to narrate its history and establish its independence, statehood and nationhood. And Russia is increasingly committed to not allow this to happen. But war only becomes possible also when Russian regime becomes fully autocratic and Ukrainian regime is increasingly more pluralistic. And why does it work this way? Because first of all, you know, democratic Ukraine is additionally kind of threatening to Russia because if you are saying that here is this country that is essentially just younger brothers and they're able to establish a functioning democratic regime, but then shall we say, join the European Union, forget even NATO, like, we could say, you know, people in Russia might say like, well, why, you know, if Ukraine can accomplish this, like, why can't we, right? And that creates a challenge to the political regime. But also more importantly even, that if you have a pluralistic, at least somewhat pluralistic political system, as Russia had in the 1990s under Yeltsin, there is a debate, it was in Russia, there has been a debate. First of all, not absolutely everybody was pro-imperial in Russia. There were some voices, you know, (unintelligible) would be one example, (unintelligible) was killed, who was, you know, explicitly not kind of pro-imperial in the way that, you know, Putin and most of the Russian elite was. But even among the pro-imperial elite, there was a disagreement about what to do with Ukraine, right? So, if you have a pluralistic system, there is, the war is not the only option, right? Like you could say they talked about creating so-called liberal empire, which basically the idea was that Russia would become a functioning democracy, would become, you know, strong market economy and all other countries, first and foremost Ukraine, would naturally gravitate to it. And yes, Russia would still control everything, but it wouldn't be this liberal empire, right? So, this would, what would basically they were saying, and this is in the way it explains why invasion happens when it happens and not earlier, because this imperial thinking about Ukraine really had been there all along. Yes, it stands under Putin but it has been there all along. But through the 90s there was a political space in Russia to basically for political class to disagree what to do, right? And then that environment, it makes it much harder to say, like, we are going to send tanks across the border and we are going to bomb Kiev, which Putin is able to do as a personalistic dictator by 2022. But this is something that would have been essentially much, much less likely had Russia retained a degree of political pluralism, right? On the other hand, had Ukraine become an authoritarian state, which was a possibility when pro-Russian President Yanukovych, who was in power, first he fails to come to power in 2005, then he comes to power in 2010. And during the three plus years that he was in power, he actually tries to mold Ukraine kind of into Russia number two, like Belarus. There is closing of independent media, arrests of political opposition, he begins to change identity politics to (unintelligible) have political regime in Ukraine had been more authoritarian, maybe invasion wouldn't have been necessary because Yanukovych essentially could have delivered vassalized Ukraine to Russia in a way that Lukashenko did in Belarus. So, in our book, we talk about the interaction of these two factors. On the one hand, identity politics that was pulling apart. It was, you know, great imperial kind of bent in Russia and greater commitment to independence in Ukraine. And then this regime dynamics that was also falling apart and the way they interacted that really explains both the invasion and the timing of the invasion, say.
GR: Well, it sounds to me also and this is a question I wanted to ask you, you've kind of already just answered it. What you've just described then also demonstrates why it's going to be so hard for this conflict to get resolved, because there are deep differences in fundamental commitments to the kind of government you're going to have and what your national identity is and about that's going on here. I mean, that's tied into the conflict, and so it's going to be very tough, it seems to me, to untangle that, right?
OS: Absolutely. I think this is why, you know, we are where we are and there is no resolution in sight, even though after, you know, years or year now almost of intense diplomacy and various, you know, attempts. Because again, the fundamental irreconcilable difference in positions and again, the regime type is also very important because this whole emphasis on like how (unintelligible) this, as Russia says, and I think Trump agrees with it, that Zelenskyy somehow is a problem, right? Like if you get rid of Zelenskyy, then like everything. But Zelenskyy is a democratically elected leader. He is beholden to what Ukrainian society would not allow. And Ukrainian leaders have learned that in recent history that when they go against societal kind of preferences, society rises up, right? So, this notion that you can just install some puppet somehow, all right, and I think that was the plan all along, this is why they went for Kiev. And they actually flew Yanukovych, the post-president they flew him to Minsk in the early weeks of the war. The hope was that they would take Zelenskyy out and install Yanukovych, and then they can wash their hands. I mean, Putin said they didn't intend to occupy, right? Like, yes, they didn't intend. Even they think that the puppet could run the country. But Ukrainian society is just different. It will not, you know, and history is there, like it shows, it just would not accept this. And this is in a way sort of a tragedy that I mean, neither Russia elites and Russian political class wants to understand it. And I think also, you know, many in the West don't quite understand it. So, if we think about what it would take for it to resolve, I mean, one thing I think, you know, if we're talking about settlement like long term, right, some sort of stable peace, I think it would take change in Russia. I can't imagine as long as Putin is in power or somebody like Putin, that we would have like the true end to the conflict and sort of like a new beginning, no, you know, war is over. Because that would be, again, the goals are not achieved, right? Even if somehow they capture more territory, right, like the border, whatever, as a square kilometers. As long as the government in Kiev sits, and as long as it's sovereign and it does its own thing and it is not under the control of Russia, the goals of the special military operations, Russia calls it, are not achieved, right? And which means Ukraine would be constantly threatened. So again, you know, for the fundamental settlements, it may take, you know, Putin leaving office, you know, through death or otherwise before even a possibility. Even if he leaves, it doesn't mean it'll happen, but at least it opens the possibility. And I think this is very important to realize that it's not just Zelenskyy, you know, it's not some sort of specific sliver of territory, is it is about these irreconcilable objectives.
GR: That's a really important point about the necessary potential, necessary change in Russia itself, but also a depressing one, I'm thinking about ending the conflict. If you've just joined us, you're listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media. I'm Grant Reeher and my guest is Tufts University professor Oxana Shevel. I want to apologize in advance for this next question, because it's going to seem almost perverse, really. And particularly given that you yourself are Ukrainian, as I understand it, correct me if I'm wrong, but you are Ukrainian.
OS: Yeah.
GR: But I have to ask it because I wonder if some of the international community, the leaders of other countries, and maybe some of the people in other countries haven't had this thought cross their mind that in some ways, this entire situation, in part because of how you have explained how deeply problematic it is, that this situation would be in some ways simpler and easier for the world if the Russians had just occupied the country, taken over the country, as many people thought that they would, that, you know, many people thought Ukraine would fall very quickly, in some ways that would be simpler. I know you don't see it that way, but I just had to put that question out there.
OS: I appreciate the question. I think whoever asked this question should really ask themselves, what do you mean by simpler? Like, simpler for whom and simpler in what way? Because let's imagine this scenario, right, that Russia has succeeded to occupy Ukraine, as you know, most expected. We know from evidence that whenever Russian occupation authority moved in, they had, literally, kill lists of all the people who they considered to be not sufficiently loyal for Russia. So, people have been arrested, people have been tortured, people have been detained, people have been disappeared, right, we have mass graves. That would have been happening on the scale of a much larger, basically with whatever territory they occupied, that would have been happening. Is that simpler, right? It is simpler maybe because in the West, people wouldn't know about it because no independent media is allowed to operate, right? So, to say it is simpler, I think it's a little bit of a misnomer, right? It is simpler as in, like, it's not in your news, but it is still happening. And these crimes would have been happening on a huge scale. Think about refugees. We've had some 6 million people who left at the beginning of the war, people would not want to live under occupation, right? We would have tens of millions probably, you know, certainly many, many more millions going to Europe, creating, you know, challenges associated with this. And then we would have also, which is maybe the most consequential thing that would not make it simple at all, if you think you in the medium to long term, as opposed to like immediate short term, this aggression is rewarded, right? The world essentially allowed a democratic country to be gobbled up by this resilient dictatorship on pretense. And then, you know, this aggressive, emboldened Putin is now on the border with Western Europe, right? What is there to prevent him, especially if the narrative is that, you know, we can't sort of, “Russia cannot lose” because it has nuclear weapons and then the worst thing happens. What is there to prevent him to go next? Why not Moldova, which is not even the NATO EU member? They have the Transnistria region with Russian speakers. In fact, that was original plan, if Odesa were to fall, like, you know, the map’s were shown that that’s Russia’s next goal. What about Estonia? They have, you know, plenty of Russians and those in Estonia, the government is quote unquote Nazi as far as Russia’s concerned. Who is going to go fight over Estonia, right? So, like that would be at least a question. So, I think if we begin to think in sort of what actually it would mean, and we can continue this list, like what it would actually mean for the world, for the West. I think the idea that it would have been simpler, I think it begins to collapse pretty quickly. So the only way it would be simpler if, you know, you can sort of close your eyes and close your ears and say, like, you know, people may be killed in Ukraine and thousands and tortured, but I don't read about it in the news because our journalists are not allowed to report and I'm going to pretend that it's not happening, right? I think that would be maybe the only way in which it would have been simpler.
GR: We've got about two minutes left, and I want to try to squeeze in two more questions if I can. So, I'm going to put you all under a little bit more of a time pressure here at the very end. The first one is a personal question and again, I know you could talk about this for quite a long time, but if you could be brief. I mentioned that you were Ukrainian, how has it been for you as a Ukrainian to see all this unfold, from a distance?
OS: You know, I grew up in Ukraine and now I’ve lived in the US longer than I lived in Ukraine. And I certainly, you know, I identify with Ukraine in some sense, but I'm under no pretense that it is somehow harder for me, given what people are going through in Ukraine. So, I consider myself, you know, even though of course, I'm affected maybe more than somebody who does not have family in connection with Ukraine, I'm very aware that whatever problems I have or whatever stress I may be under is nothing in comparison with what people are going through in Ukraine. So, I try to do my bit including, you know, talking to the media and writing academic and policy facing work to educate the people of what goes on. I feel like that's the contribution I can make to share my expertise, so that's what I would say.
GR: Okay. And then my last question here and again, we'll have to be very brief under a minute. If you were advising President Trump, what would you be telling him to do? What should America be doing? Very quickly.
OS: Pressure Russia. That would be my advice, pressure Russia. Don't believe Putin's gaslighting, this whole notion that they are like inevitably winning, that Ukraine has no cards. If you look at the evidence and the course that they’re suffering, Russia, and the sort of snail pace in which they may be, you know, take something over and the strain the economy is under, US has a lot of leverage. Pressure Russia, make Putin see that he cannot accomplish more than he already has. And he has to be forced to an agreement, ceasefire or the current contact line that Ukraine is willing to go for. So, I think that would be my advice, don't fall for Russian gaslighting.
GR: We'll have to leave it there. That was Oxana Shevel, and again, her recent book is titled, “Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories diverging States” and certainly understanding how complex and interwoven these two countries are, and you'll get that through this book, will help you understand why this war has been so hard to end. Professor Shevel, thanks so much for taking the time with me, I really learned a lot from this conversation.
OS: Thanks very much.
GR: You've been listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media, conversations in the public interest.
