Program transcript:
Grant Reeher: Welcome to the Campbell Conversations, I’m Grant Reeher. The recent midterms saw, in addition to a blue wave, a number of new kinds of faces elected to federal and statewide offices, including African Americans in the South and Indigenous Americans in the Midwest and West. But now there's another important type of diversity still missing among prominent elected officials: middle class and working-class Americans. My guest today has co-written a recent book on this topic. Nicholas Carnes is a political science professor at Duke University's Sanford School of Public Policy, and with Noam Lupu, he's the author of "Keeping Workers Off the Ballot: How Democracy Undermines Working-Class Representation." Professor Carnes, welcome to the program.
Nicholas Carnes: Thank you so much for having me.
GR: Well, we really appreciate you making the time. So, I mentioned it at the outset, but tell us a little bit about the characteristic regarding political representation that animates your book that you're concerned with here.
NC: So, we're really interested in why working-class people almost never go on to hold elected office, especially offices at the National level in the US, like Congress. This is something that my coauthor and I have studied here in the US. You know, working-class jobs make up about half of our labor force, but typically around 1 to 2% of members of Congress had a working-class job when they got into politics. And this book is trying to understand that pattern at the global level. So, we conducted sort of a global look at worker representation in national legislatures in every democracy and found that the gap is about as big or even bigger than here in the US. Typical global democracy has about 70% of its labor force that the, you know, made up of working-class jobs as we define them, but only about 2% of their national legislators had a working-class job when they got into politics. So, this book is trying to understand, you know, why that is.
GR: It's interesting now, I'm a little surprised that we are not, I don't know if the behind is the right word or out of step with a lot of other Western democracies, because I'm thinking of a couple that come to mind where it does seem like there are pathways for the working and maybe I would say, you know, lower middle classes in. So, this is a phenomenon across all Western democracies then?
NC: That right. And I kind of, you know, I think there's a sense in which you might think, well, gosh, the US is worse off, like, we have, you know, out of control campaign spending and our labor unions are, you know, under attack, and, you know, unionization rates are low. And so you can imagine all these things about our system that might make us worse. But what we're seeing globally is even in places that don't have those properties, working-class people still aren't going on and holding elected office in, you know, higher numbers or much higher numbers. The way I think about it is, something sort of like you can't fall off the floor, like it's close to zero and the vast majority of democracies. And maybe it's even harder in the US, but, there's not really, you know, we're, you know, there's not really room to to go down any further, numerically.
GR: Right, right, yeah, 1% versus 2%. So, have there been any long-term trends or more recent trends in the United States in regard to this that are worth noting? And was there a time when we were different?
NC: The long-term trend in the US is kind of a flat line. So, you can go back to sort of the, you know, heyday of the American labor movement. You can go back before Citizens United, you know, sort of in any period in U.S. history when we have data, working-class representation looks about like it does today, which is to say, you know, between 0 and 2% of members of Congress had these working-class jobs when they got into politics. It's a little more sporadic when you start to look at the data on like, state legislatures. We don't have data from every single year, but the patterns are pretty similar. They're, you know, it's between 1 and 5% at the state legislative level. So, it doesn't look like there was a kind of good old days, you know, as tempting as it is to think that things must have been better in the past, we don't really see that in the US. There are a few democracies, and we talk about this in the book, there are few democracies in Europe where there was a big spike in worker representation, you know, typically in the middle of the 20th century, kind of after World War Two, you know, there's some big spike in worker office holding. But those are temporary. So, the pattern is either a flat line close to zero or, you know, an increase in the beginning of the 20th century. And then the second half of the 20th century a drop and a tapering off. So, you know, the pattern is, you know, at best, temporary representation for workers.
GR: One of the things that popped into my mind when I was thinking about our history was the old, city centered party bosses, particularly in the Democratic Party. You know, that seems like a real working-class sort of phenomenon. But the leaders that emerged out of that and represented Congress were still sort of more of the professionals, even there?
NC: By the time they reach, you know, the state legislative level or the national level, you think Congress, you know, there's been some filtering out. If workers were getting into, you know, our kind of machine politics cities, they were not filtering up to the institutions where we have data. So, unfortunately, I can't really say with a lot of precision what US cities looks like, you know, 50 or 60 years ago or really at any point in history before kind of the modern era. I just don't have those data myself.
GR: Sure, yeah. Well, let me, I probably should have asked you this right at the beginning, but it's important before we go further, you know, you said working-class as we define it, and you said about half of the workforce in the United States fits that category. Just tell us briefly what working-class means in your book.
NC: So, we use, we're interested in jobs that don't require a lot of, like, capital. So, you don't need to own a business or a lot of equipment, and they don't require a lot of formal education. And these are jobs that are kind of the most precarious in our economy. They're jobs that are easy to get, but that are maybe difficult to do and that don't provide you with a lot of the kind of good stuff that society gives to people, you know, job security, high wages, prestige. These are, in practical terms, manual labor, jobs like construction worker, service industry jobs like restaurant server, clerical jobs like receptionist. These are the, you know, jobs that make up a little over half of our labor force. If you go back 100 years, these jobs make up about 60% of the labor force. So it's a pretty you know, it's a slow decline during the kind of information age. But these jobs are still most of the labor force. And, you know, life in our country, life in any country is just unthinkable without the people who do these kinds of jobs.
GR: I'm Grant Reeher, and I'm speaking with Duke University political scientist Nicholas Carnes, the coauthor of "Keeping Workers Off the Ballot: How Democracy Undermines Working-Class Representation." So, this next question is one that may seem quite obvious to you and a lot of our listeners, but I want to make sure that we do investigate it a bit. Why is this phenomenon a problem for ‘small d’ democracy? What's the concern?
NC: There are a couple of concerns. One is just the fact that we, I think on an ethical level want democracy to be open to everybody. Democracy is supposed to be of, by, and for the people. And anytime you see a social group being excluded from some important part of political participation, systematically and over time, and in the case of this book, in every country people tend to say that's a problem from a philosophical or ethical perspective, that this group that is so important to our society, basically never has a shot or almost never has a shot of holding major elected office. There's also a practical concern that's related, which is that we know, there's an old saying in politics, if you're not at the table, you're on the menu.
GR: (laughter)
NC: When working-class people don't have a seat at the table in institutions that make decisions that affect all of us, the consequences are predictable. You know, business regulations are flimsier, social safety net programs are stingy or, you know, public policy tilts more towards what the well-off want when working class people aren't present in these institutions. That doesn't mean you can't have an amazing pro-worker politician who was themselves, you know, very privileged or white collar. That does happen. But on average, the trends over time and from place to place are very clear, which is, when working-class people aren't there, the interests of working-class people are what's being sacrificed when we have to make tough tradeoffs in our political institutions.
GR: Yeah. I mean, when you said that, you know, there are there are privileged people that are champions of the working class, of course, maybe the most famous example of that would be Franklin Roosevelt, I suppose, yeah. Well, so one of the things that that occurred to me as I was looking through your book, thinking about this issue, was this question of, do you think in recent decades, in terms of our awareness of this, the perception of it as a problem, that the emphasis, particularly on the democratic side of the equation, which is where we normally would think, you know, all things being equal, more working-class representation would happen, does the focus on certain kinds of ethnic identity politics and other kinds of identity politics, like gender identity, sexuality, etc., do you think that might divert our attention away from this economic issue? If we're saying, you know, how many people of X or Y are in Congress?
NC: You know, maybe. But I have kind of an optimistic take on this question, Grant, which is that I think it's possible to kind of walk and chew gum at the same time when it comes to representation. And the conditions are really favorable for this. Women and racial and ethnic minorities are numerically overrepresented in working-class jobs. So it is, you know, really quite possible to increase, this is just to say that, you know, white collar jobs, professional jobs are more often held by white men. And so, you know, just in numerical terms, it's straightforward to increase the representation of multiple groups at the same time. Now, you asked about attention, and I think, you know, I think there's plenty of bandwidth out there in the reform and advocacy community to do both things at once. I just think that hasn't been what's historically happened. And maybe that's understandable. Like, it's hard to change the demographics of a political institution like Congress. Any one race is, you know, such a massive undertaking. And so, I don't think, you know, this book or, you know, us as researchers, I don't think we want to throw stones at reformers who have been fighting to get women or people of color into office. That's already an incredibly hard thing to do. I think there's potential, though, to do kind of both things at once and to say, okay, can we find women and people of color who are also working-class? And they're out there and they're, you know, they're amazing candidates when they run, they do great. So, you know, I think it's, there's plenty of room to, kind of do, you know, multiple, to care about multiple dimensions of representation at the same time.
GR: Okay. And then what causes this problem? I mean, you spent quite a bit of time in the book, sort of, here's why this happens. Aside from some of the obvious things we might think, go ahead and tell me that.
NC: No, but I have spent probably about ten years trying to understand this, we've chased down, a lot of, you know, kind of false leads. And there was kind of a phase of our research on this where there were a lot of hunches that were out there that we thought we needed to take seriously, but that we weren't optimistic about. And those were often kind of explanations that really place the blame either on the voters or on working-class people. So, there was a lot of, one explanation as well, you know, if working-class people don't hold office in a democracy, that's just democracy for you, it means that the voters have chosen professionals, or, you know, well-off people. And that's not actually true. It's the case that working-class people just don't run. When they run, they do well, both in real elections and in, you know, survey experiments where we randomize the characteristics of candidates, working-class people tend to do just fine. It's that, the problem is they don't run. This isn't the voters making a choice, it's the choice is being made before the voters ever get to the ballot box. The other sort of big category of explanations that we heard a lot about said, there's something wrong with working class people themselves, and we just don't see any evidence for that whatsoever. We've done our best to measure, and this is a very murky concept, but, in all the ways we can, we’ve tried to measure sort of who has the potential to become a candidate and there just are never big gaps between working class people. They're interested, they're politically engaged at rates that are similar enough to professionals that we could never say, oh, well, the problem is workers just aren't qualified. So, we kind of take those explanations off the table and say, okay, what else is there, if it's not a problem with the voters and it's not a problem with workers?
GR: I want to come back then and ask you what that thing is and put one possibility to you when we come back from the break. You're listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media. I'm Grant Reeher, and I'm talking with Nicholas Carnes. He's a political science professor at Duke's Sanford School of Public Policy, and coauthor of a recent book titled "Keeping Workers Off the Ballot: How Democracy Undermines Working-Class Representation." So, I wanted to pick up on this question of what causes it. And, just tell you a quick story, it may sound familiar to you, but I do know a few members of Congress or people who have run and I've heard this story more than once, that when they go down to Washington, to meet the National Party people, you know, when they're when they're sort of identified as a potentially serious candidate. First thing they're asked is, do you have a network of people that you can call tomorrow and get them to max out on your campaign in terms of contributions? You know, that's to the tune of about $5,000 plus right now, dollars. Who has that kind of list? Does that get at sort of your point that these people don't run, they're really not encouraged to run, they're not recruited? Tell us more about why, what is actually keeping the working-class folks off these ballots?
NC: So, I think that's a key. And I think that's a great way to understand the kind of dynamic that Noam and I are seeing all over the world, not just in the US, not just in Congress, but in democracies around the world. And that is sort of two things happening. The first is that it's extremely hard to run for office, even taking campaign finance off the table, fundraising off the table for a second, even in places where elections don't cost as much, running for office is extremely burdensome. You have to give up time, energy, privacy, you take big risks, you don't know what the future holds. And that, in and of itself, screens working-class people out. They are less able to just take huge risks with their lives when you're in a job that's already more precarious. The other piece of it is that party leaders, interest groups get what we call sort of collectively gatekeepers. They know this. And even the gatekeepers who like working-class people, even, you know, you imagine a political party that brings people to Washington, says we like working class people, we want to appeal to working class voters. They also understand this basic reality of elections, that it's extremely hard for working class people to run. And so, they are going to pass over working-class people in favor of, you know, candidates who they know are going to have an easier time running. It's often not quite as dramatic as what you describe, Grant. It's not like a party leader bringing you into their office and sitting you down and saying, you need to raise a ton of money today or tomorrow, but it happens in all sorts of ways. And it's basically, the people who could help working class candidates kind of get over that initial barrier. They understand the system, and they're saying to candidates in various ways, or not saying the candidates, I'm going to recommend someone who I know will have an easier time. So, a lot of workers aren't even getting to that stage, they're not even being called into the office. They're just being skipped entirely without even knowing it.
GR: And so, I know you mentioned at the outset that this is a, you know, a worldwide phenomenon for Western democracies that, you know, no one really gets over 2%. Are there any countries out there that do a better job of this? I mean, I'm thinking maybe, you know, someplace like, I'm just using stereotypes here, but like Norway maybe or something, you know, are there any places that are more attentive to this kind of thing?
NC: So, Sweden and Denmark do a little better.
GR: Okay, I wasn't far off, all right.
NC: You weren't far off. And they get into the teams in terms of worker office holding, being, you know, 16% in one year in Sweden. Japan, I think, breaks into the double digits in the year where we collected data. In the case of Japan, it looks like the explanation may just be a really compressed campaign season. So, elections are about two weeks long, or campaigns are about two weeks long. And that just means that it's a lot less burdensome to run. You know, you have to take less time off work, give up less of your life, risk less of you know, your sort of resources and your time. And so, there are cases like these, but they're just kind of the exceptions that prove the rule. And they tend to not last forever. So the, what we find is that even times in places where workers are holding office in large numbers, eventually the sort of unusual circumstances that contribute to that break down. What we found, the sort of most common configuration that gives us double digit numbers of workers in office is powerful organized labor unions that form partnerships with specific political parties, and have an institutional relationship to supply new candidates. When that happens, you do see workers getting into office, and that seems to be what's happening in the Nordics, Sweden and Denmark. But over time, those relationships always break down. Nothing lasts forever in politics. And when that happens, we're kind of back to, you know, 1 to 2%.
GR: And that leads me directly to ask you about Britain, because when you just use that description, I thought, that reminds me of the Labor Party in Britain. But is Britain one of these where that's fallen away?
NC: The British Labor Party is, I think, the best example of this process. So, and we have a long section on the British Labor Party in the book. When the party was founded, it was actually founded for the express purpose of electing working-class people. It grew right out of the labor movement. Its headquarters were in the transport union's physical office building. And there was a party system where the unions got to nominate one list of candidates that received substantial support. And so, you know, during the heyday of the British Labor Party, we see the highest recorded rates of working-class office holding in the national legislature anywhere in the world, up above 25%. And then over time, the British Labor Party eventually transitions and becomes a middle-class party. There's lots of union, so, the labor unions stop being the only game in town, lots of professions begin unionizing. And over time, the Labor Party shifts its focus to trying to capture sort of middle-class voters and professional unions and worker representation goes back down. Again, nothing lasts forever in politics. And so, yeah, that's our sort of textbook case of this process of kind of worker representation, but then the party, just those arrangements eventually falling by the wayside as the times change.
GR: Yeah, that's interesting. I have a friend in Parliament and he happens to be in the Labor Party, and he was originally a plumber, which in the United States would not be considered a working class anymore, probably in terms of the salaries of plumbers if they're in their business for themselves. But anyway, yeah, that's interesting. If you've just joined us, you're listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media and my guest is Nicholas Carnes. He's the coauthor of "Keeping Workers Off the Ballot: How Democracy Undermines Working-Class Representation." So, we've got a fair amount of chunk of time left and I wanted to give you most of it to sketch out what your recommendations are for the United States, because, as you noted at the beginning, you know, we don't have a recent tradition of strong unions. You know, it seems like there's some in the public sector, teacher’s unions and so on, but you get out of that area and it's not a terribly strong movement right now. So what could we do in the United States, do you think, to get our numbers up in this regard, be more democratically representative?
NC: I'm glad you asked, Grant. Noam and I just finished a report with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences that tries to lay out exactly this, sort of a blueprint for different kinds of people who might care about this, party leaders, nonprofits, elected officials who want to change the laws. It's called “How to Elect More Working-Class Americans.” There are things you can do. So, we already talked about how, you know, strong unions for workers or organizations that represent working class people can form institutionalized partnerships with political parties. When that happens, that's kind of the best case scenario. Those relationships eventually break down over time. But, you know, while they exist, those seem to be, worldwide, the best predictors of workers holding office in large numbers. There are lots of other things you can do, though. So, if you're a political party leader for instance, or a nonprofit director, you can create recruitment and training programs for working-class people. So, in Oregon, there's a labor candidate school in Nevada, there's a labor candidate school in New Jersey, there's the AFL-CIO, the state federation runs the longest, the sort of most venerable labor candidate school I can find in the US, where they identify, recruit, train and support candidates, and send them on their way and continue supporting them after they get elected. Their program lists a 75% win rate on its website. So, this isn't kind of a political pipe dream, it's, you know, actually pretty straightforward when parties and organizations devote resources to creating pipeline programs for workers, workers get into office. So, there are a lot of, you know, there are a lot of things we can do to give workers a seat at the table. There are also ways we can think about modifying our institutions to kind of lock in worker representation or to build in pathways for workers that don't depend on these kinds of historically unique configurations continuing to exist.
GR: Yeah, that makes sense. I am the faculty leader for a program here at Syracuse that's devoted to helping veterans pursue elected office and we have two people now in Congress. So, you know, it's, but a lot of people at the state level. So, yeah, it makes sense. All right, so, last thing I wanted to talk to you about, we’ve just got a couple of minutes left, is whether these midterms that I referenced at the beginning give us any glimmers or anything of that nature. Because it did seem like there were some narratives in some of these races that did sort of feel a little bit like what you're talking about. You know, maybe this one crashed and burn, but maybe Graham Platner, it turns out he's rather privileged in terms of his background, but he was touted as, hey, you know, he's an oyster farmer. Is there anything in the midterms that you want to talk about regarding this issue?
NC: There's lots to talk about, including the kind of, you know, Graham Platner working-class vibes phenomenon. So, there are a lot of candidates there that are kind of, you know, put up as working-class candidates in the media or by their own campaigns, but it turns out they actually, you know, had pretty comfortable lives or don't have, you know, what we would define, what Noam and I would define as working class jobs. When we, you know, sort of looked at the major party candidates running this cycle, we found the sort of best of times, worst of times, kind of finding. Worst of times in the sense that we only found seven working-class, people who listed on their website a working-class job among the 930 some major party candidates running for Congress this cycle. So, just a really tiny number, less than 1% had a working-class job listed as their last main occupation on their campaign website. But then of those seven candidates, one of them became a US senator, Troy Jackson. And, the seven candidates, most of them won, so, four won. And they outperformed their parties in terms of their improvement in their vote share from the last election cycle. So, this is kind of all consistent with our research. You know, when workers run, they did just find this cycle, which they typically do in elections. The problem is just very few run. And I, Grant, I don't know about you, but I had this sense this cycle, people were paying more attention to this issue. There was a lot of talk about working-class candidates. So, I think that's great. But even in the midst of that kind of discussion, only seven ran.
GR: All right. Well, that is, as you say, half hopeful. We'll have to leave it with Charles Dickens there, best of times, worst of times. That was Nicholas Carnes. And again, his new book, written with Noam Lupu is "Keeping Workers Off the Ballot: How Democracy Undermines Working-Class Representation." It's an important and understudied aspect of political representation. Professor Carnes, thanks so much for talking to me and illuminating us about this.
NC: Thank you again for having me.
GR: You've been listening to the Campbell Conversations on WRVO Public Media, conversations in the public interest.